Water Law Review
Volume 8

Issue 1

Article 6

9-1-2004

Water Quality Standards and Indian Tribes: Are Tribes Afraid of
Clean Water
Kurt R. Moser

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Kurt R. Moser, Water Quality Standards and Indian Tribes: Are Tribes Afraid of Clean Water, 8 U. Denv.
Water L. Rev. 27 (2004).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

WATER QUALITY STANDARDS AND INDIAN
TRIBES: ARE TRIBES AFRAID OF CLEAN WATER?
KURT R. MOSER!
I.
II.

II.

Ill.
IV.

Introduction ....................................................................... 27
State Challenges to EPA Delegations of Water Quality
Regulatory Authority to Tribes ........................................... 29
A. Facts and Background ...................................................... 31
1. The Sokaogon (or Mole Lake) Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians ..................................................... 31
2. "Treatment as a State" and the CWA ........................... 32
3. EPA's Application of the Montana Test ...................... 32
4. W isconsin's Argum ent.................................................. 34
35
...................
5. The EPA's Argument .......
6. The Seventh Circuit's Decision .................................. 36
B . A nalysis ...............................................................................
37
1. The Court's Conclusion Was Proper and Relied Upon
Established Precedent ................................................ 37
2. Equal Footing Claims Under Baker and
the M ontana Test .......................................................... 39
3. The Montana Test and Off-Reservation Activities .......... 39
4. Another Case for Another Day ................................... 41
C . Conclusion ........................................................................ 41
Risks Inherent in the Pursuit of Individual Tribal Delegations
42
of Regulatory Authority ......................................................
A. Strate v. A-i Contractors...................................................... 42
B. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley ........................................... 43
46
C. N evada v. H icks...................................................................
EPA'S Approach to Tribal Delegations Under the Clean Water
49
Act - Is Federal Promulgation the Answer? .........................
Conclusion ...........................................................................
52
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1991 the United States Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") promulgated the final rule specifying how the federal gov1. B.S., University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point, 1990; J.D. Candidate, University of
Montana School of Law, 2005. The author wishes to thank Professor Raymond Cross
for his guidance in preparing and researching this article. This article is dedicated to
the memory of Claudia Johnson, a sovereignty warrior.
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ernment could treat Indian tribes as states for establishing water quality standards under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") . Since that time,
only twenty-three tribes have enacted water quality standards approved
by the EPA.' This lack of regulation is alarming for at least two reasons: (1) there are at least 278 tribal areas administered as federal Indian reservations;' and (2) since implementation of the 1987 amendments to the CWA, state water quality standards have not been in force
within Indian country.' It is difficult to say for certain why many tribes
do not have water quality standards yet. However, the following discussion reveals one key reason: states may challenge a tribal delegation of
water quality standards authority. In this time of a perceived narrowing of tribal jurisdiction by the Rehnquist Court, Indian tribes, as well
as tribal advocates, may be concerned with the potential repercussions
another unfavorable court decision may create in a civil regulatory
context. Other reasons for the lack of tribal participation in the water
quality standards program may simply be that tribes, as compared to
states, have had less time and resources, and some tribal governments
simply have different priorities.'
Throughout the 1990s the EPA struggled with how to address the
regulation of water quality in Indian country. Initially, the EPA worked
with tribes to develop water quality standards and the corresponding
authority to do so on a reservation-by-reservation basis.7 After growing
concern mounted over state challenges and the lack of federally approved tribal programs, the EPA pursued federally implemented core
water quality standards.' The EPA Administrator signed the proposed
rule on January 19, 2001, and the new Administrator withdrew it on
January 22, 2001.' On January 29, 2004, the EPA issued an Interim
2. Requirements for Indian Tribes to Administer a Water Quality Standards Program, 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (2003).
3. Letter from Denise M. Keehner, Director of U.S. EPA Standards and Health
Division, to Kurt R. Moser (Sept. 16, 2003) (on file with author).
4. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 8 (3d
ed. 1993).
5. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,889 (proposed Dec. 12, 1991) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
6. James M. Grijalva, Where Are the Tribal Water Quality Standards and TMDLs?, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2003, at 63, 67-68.

7.

See U.S. EPA,

REFERENCE GUIDE TO WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR INDIAN

TRIBES 6 (1990).
8. Federal Water Quality Standards for Indian Country and Other Provisions Regarding Federal Water Quality Standards (proposed Jan. 18, 2001) (to be codified at
40
C.F.R.
pts.
121,
122,
123,
131,
230,
and
233),
at
http://www.epa.gov/ost/standards/tribal/proposedcore200l.pdf
(unofficial
prepublication copy of the proposed rule) (last updated Nov. 2, 2004).
9. U.S. EPA, LAws & REGULATIONS: FEDERAL WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR
Nov. 2, 2004).
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Draft Outreach and Consultation Plan ("Interim Plan") regarding the
implementation of federal water quality standards in Indian country.
Although the Interim Plan stated the EPA still preferred tribes adopt
and develop their own water quality standards, it also acknowledged
the current gaps in water quality protection in Indian country were
significant and it was unlikely many tribes would adopt and develop
their own water quality standards in the near future." This gap in
regulatory coverage was significant for other reasons as well. As time
goes by, state regulatory authority may continue to "creep" onto reservations areas where a combination of tribal and federal inaction has
resulted in "de facto" state regulation." This regulatory void may enhance state claims that state intrusions into the arena of reservation
water quality standards do not affect tribal self-government.'"
This article first analyzes several state challenges to tribal delegations of water quality standards authority, concentrating on the most
recent decision of Wisconsin v. EPA.' Secondly, this article discusses
recent United States Supreme Court cases that led some to warn tribes
against seeking treatment-as-state ("TAS") authority under the CWA
and about the risks tribes may face if they continue to pursue individual delegations of authority as the EPA prefers. Lastly, this article discusses whether the EPA's proposed approach of federally promulgated
standards in Indian country is a prudent response to the inherent risks
of individual tribal delegations.
II. STATE CHALLENGES TO EPA DELEGATIONS OF WATER
QUALITY REGULATORY AUTHORITY TO TRIBES
When states have challenged individual tribal delegations of water
quality standards authority, three different United States Circuit Courts
of Appeals have supported tribal regulatory authority in each case.
This article discusses all three of these decisions within the following
analysis of the most recent case, Wisconsin v. EPA.'"
In Wisconsin v. EPA, the State of Wisconsin sought to overturn an
EPA decision granting the Sokaogon Chippewa Community TAS status
pursuant to section 518 of the CWA. 6 The Act empowered the Administrator to give federally recognized Indian tribes the authority to administer a water quality standards program for waters within the exte10.

U.S. EPA, INTERIM DRAFr OUTREACH

AND CONSULTATION PLAN: FEDERAL WATER

(Jan. 29, 2004),
COUNTRY 1
http://ww,.epa.gov/ost/standards/triba/2004outreach-consultationplan- -29.pdf.
11.
Id.
12. Grijalva, supra note 6, at 69.
13. Id.
14. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 743-44; 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2000).
QUALITY

STANDARDS

FOR

WATERS

IN

INDIAN
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rior boundaries of their respective reservations. After reviewing the
Sokaogon's application, the EPA delegated TAS authority to the Sokaogon on September 29, 1995." Following this approval, Wisconsin
filed suit to challenge the EPA's decision. Wisconsin claimed the Sokaogon had no right to regulate water quality within the reservation
because the State had sole jurisdiction over that right.'" Wisconsin
based its argument largely upon the Equal Footing Doctrine and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Wisconsin v. Baker.' The
Baker court held a Wisconsin Indian tribe could not regulate the fishing activities of nonmembers fishing on the reservation partly because
the State owned the lake beds. 1
However, in a unanimous decision, the Seventh Circuit concluded
it was reasonable for the EPA to allow the Sokaogon to regulate water
quality under the CWA.' Further, the court determined the Sokaogon
satisfied the Montana test, derived from Montana v. United States." This
decision was significant for Indian tribes because the Sokaogon own
one-hundred percent of the land within the boundaries of their reservation." Arguably, if a tribe owning one-hundred percent of the reservation could not demonstrate authority under the CWA to administer a
water quality standards program, a tribe having less than one-hundred
percent land ownership would have little chance of acquiring jurisdiction over its water quality standards.
The Seventh Circuit's determination that Baker did not control this
case was also significant." Wisconsin used the Baker decision to advance its claim under the Equal Footing Doctrine." A few months before the Seventh Circuit's decision, the United States Supreme Court
in Idaho v. United States held a tribe might have title to submerged
lands, provided the government established the tribe's reservation before the state gained statehood." In doing so, the Court reinforced the
notion that ownership of submerged lands is strongly associated with
the sovereign power of government.2 In spite of the Court's affirmation of this relationship, the Seventh Circuit effectively distinguished
17.

Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 744.

18. Id. at 745.
19. Id. at 746.
20. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323, 1335 (7th Cir. 1983)).
21. Baker, 698 F.2d at 1335.
22. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 747.
23. Id. at 748, 750 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (holding a tribe could exercise civil authority over non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation if their conduct had a direct effect on the political integrity, economic security,
or health and welfare of the tribe)).

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 745.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 746.
I atI-v. (ciatina oLtted),
.JJ3U S. 2U5., 2 7
Id. at 272 (citations omitted).

(r.1.
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the present case and did so where the government created the reservation after granting statehood. The Seventh Circuit's decision that ownership of submerged lands did not preclude the regulation of water
quality disposed of Wisconsin's cornerstone argument.'
The significance of Wisconsin v. EPA is tempered by the unknown.
Although the decision sets the standard for a tribe that owns onehundred percent of its land, the real battle for reservation water quality
may still lie ahead if Wisconsin or another state chooses to challenge
an EPA decision where a tribe's reservation contains alienated, or fee
simple, land.
A. FACTS AND BACKGROUND

1. The Sokaogon (or Mole Lake) Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians
The Sokaogon are one of six Chippewa (Ojibwe) tribes located in
Wisconsin.' The tribe has historically relied upon fish, game, and wild
rice to support its subsistence lifestyle." Though the tribe ceded large
portions of its land in 1842 through a treaty with the federal government, the federal government did not officially recognize the tribe
until 1937.32 The government established the boundaries of the Sokaogon reservation in 1939, with additional land holdings added in
1982.2" The entire reservation encompasses only 1,850 acres.'
In 1994 the Crandon Mining Company proposed opening a zinccopper sulfide mine two-miles north, and upstream, of the reservation. " The proposed mine threatened to cause environmental harm to
Rice Lake, an important wild rice lake on the reservation and to other
natural resources in the area.' Wisconsin worried the tribe's proposed
regulations would not allow the mine to discharge pollutants into
nearby waters, thus potentially limiting mine activities or prohibiting
the mine altogether.37 In August 1994 the Sokaogon applied for TAS
status to administer a water quality standards program on their reserva29. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 746-47.
30. See History of the Sokaogon Chippewa, Mole Lake Band, HISTORY OF THE SOKAOGON
CHIPPEWA, at http://www.sokaogonchippewa.com/history.htm (last visited Dec. 7,
2004).
Sarah M. Mandleco, Surviving a State's Challenge to the EPA's Grant of "Treatment
31.
as State" Status Under the Clean WaterAct: One Tibe's Story: State of Wisconsin v. EPA and
Sokaogon Chippewa Community, 8 Wis. ENVTL. LJ. 197, 199-201 (2002).
32. Id. at 200-01.
33. Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Exxon Corp., 805 F.Supp. 680, 690 (E.D. Wis.
1992).
34. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 745.
35. Mandleco, supra note 31, at 202.
36. Id. at 203.
37. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 745.
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tion.' Despite strong opposition from Wisconsin, the EPA approved
the tribe's TAS application on September 29, 1995."9
2. "Treatment as a State" and the CWA
In 1987, congressional amendments to the CWA authorized the
treatment of tribes as states for purposes of gaining regulatory authority under several CWA provisions, including the authority to establish
water quality standards." Since the passage of the CWA in 1972, the
EPA delegated the authority of setting water quality standards to
states.4 The EPA sets certain minimum requirements states must
adopt in their water quality standards prior to a state gaining program
approval.12 If a state fails to adopt water quality standards that adhere
to the requirements of the CWA, the EPA will promulgate such a standard.43 In order for a tribe to be eligible to administer a water quality
standards program, a tribe must first apply to the EPA for TAS status.
In 1994 the EPA adopted four criteria a tribe must meet in order to
gain TAS approval: (1) the Secretary of the Interior must recognize the
tribe; (2) the tribe must have a governing body that carries out substantial governmental duties and powers; (3) the tribe must exercise
functions pertaining to the management and protection of water resources, which are held by a tribal member if such property interest is
subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or, otherwise, within the
borders of an Indian reservation; and (4) the tribe must be capable of
carrying out the functions of an effective water quality standards program in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of the CWA
and regulations.45 Once a tribe receives TAS authority, it must formally
adopt water quality standards, subject to EPA approval.
3. EPA's Application of the Montana Test
The Montana test arose from a hunting and fishing rights case,
Montana v. United States, involving the Crow Tribe's ability to regulate
the activity of nonmembers on alienated, or fee simple, reservation
lands.47 The United States Supreme Court generally denied tribal
38.
39.

40.
41.
42.
131.6.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.

33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2000).
State Authority, 40 C.F.R. § 131.4 (2003).
Minimum Requirements for Water Quality Standards Submission, 40 C.F.R. §
EPA Promulgation of Water Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 131.22.
33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(1)-(3) (detailing how a tribe qualifies to be treated as a

state).

45.
4A

47.

Requirements for Eligibility of Indian Tribes, 40 C.F.R. § 123.31 (a) (1)-(4).
F.PA Prnm,,llgtinn nf Water Qlality Standards. 40 CF.R. § 131.22.
Montana v.United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).
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regulation of nonmembers on alienated land, but created the following exceptions: (1) when the nonmembers enter into consensual relationships with the tribe, or (2) when the conduct of nonmembers
"threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe."48 The Montana
test's second exception was at issue in Wisconsin v. EPA.
Congressional direction found in section 518 of the CWA does not
indicate an expectation for tribes seeking TAS status to be held to the
Montana test. However, an agency decision made the Montana test a
requirement for tribes wishing to regulate the conduct of nonmembers
living on alienated land within the boundaries of a reservation."9 In
fact, one court noted that although the EPA declined to interpret section 518 as a direct delegation of regulatory jurisdiction to tribes,
"there are some who do interpret section 518(e) in that fashion."'
Judge Lovell's district court opinion suggested Congress may have intended section 518 to be a direct delegation to tribes because (1) the
only ambiguity in the congressional record related to water quantity,
not water quality, and (2) "the statutory language seem [ed] to indicate
plainly that Congress did intend to delegate such authority to tribes if
the three criteria listed in section 518(e) were met."'" However, none
of the criteria listed in section 518(e) mentioned anything about a
tribe needing to satisfy the Montana test. Nonetheless, in the Federal
Register, the EPA documented its Montana test approach in determining whether or not a tribe could meet the jurisdictional hurdle in dealing with alienated land and nonmembers."5 While one could argue
Congress did not authorize the EPA to rewrite the congressional mandate delegating TAS authority to tribes, the EPA nevertheless holds
tribal TAS applications for water quality standards authority to the
Montana test. Federal courts will generally grant an agency considerable latitude in interpreting the regulations it administers, provided
the agency's actions are not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."53
The EPA wrote the tribal water quality standards regulation under
the presumption it would be easier for tribes to meet Montana's second
exception for water quality protection than it had been for zoning

48. Id. at 565-66 (internal citations omitted).
49. See Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,877 (proposed Dec. 12,
1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
50. Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945, 957 (D. Mont. 1996).
51. Id.at951.
52. See Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,877.
53. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (2000).
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regulations." In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, the United States Supreme Court applied the Montana
test and concluded the lack of tribal zoning regulations could threaten
the health and welfare of the tribe." Even though the relationship between water quality and the Sokaogon's health and welfare seemed
obvious to the EPA, Wisconsin remained unconvinced.
4. Wisconsin's Argument
Wisconsin took the EPA's decision as an affront to its sovereignty
and worried about the potential limitations tribal water quality standards might place on pollutant discharges from the proposed Exxon
mine. " Wisconsin reasoned since it owned title to the beds underlying
all waters on the reservation, the tribe could not assert any regulatory
authority over water quality." Wisconsin claimed the Equal Footing
Doctrine granted it tide to all submerged lands upon the State's admission to the Union in 1848." Since the federal government did not establish the Sokaogon reservation until 1939, Wisconsin contended its
regulatory authority reigned supreme." The State argued Wisconsin v.
Baker precluded the Sokaogon from regulating the activities of nonmembers, and, therefore, the Montanatest was irrelevant.'
Finally, Wisconsin argued even if the Montana test applied, the
regulation of water quality failed to meet the test's second exception.
The State disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Montana v.
EPA, where the court upheld the EPA's application of the Montana test
in a tribal water quality standards case." Wisconsin claimed nothing in
the administrative record suggested the tribe's right to self-governance
was in jeopardy." The State reasoned the EPA failed to recognize that
Wisconsin regulated all state waters, and, further, the EPA erroneously
applied the Montana test to off-reservation activities. 3 With all of these
arguments, Wisconsin challenged the EPA's third criteria for approv-

54. See Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,877 (comparing zoning standards
to the Montana test).
55. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 443 (1989).
56. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2001).
57. Id. at 746.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926) (concluding
that the Equal Footing Doctrine granted Minnesota title to a lake bed upon admission
to the Union).

59. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 21-22, Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir.
2001) (No. 99-2618).
60.

Id. at 28, 34.

61.

Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998).

63.

Id. at 34-37.
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ing TAS applications: as the Seventh Circuit summarized, the third
criteria required the tribe demonstrate its "inherent authority to regulate water quality within the borders of the reservation."'
Wisconsin's argument heavily relied upon which party actually
owned the beds of the reservation's surface waters. However, the EPA
never disputed bed ownership. As the following argument elucidates,
the EPA was only concerned with the authority to regulate water quality above the disputed beds.
5. The EPA's Argument
The EPA argued Wisconsin's ownership of submerged lands was
not dispositive in determining jurisdiction over reservation water quality. In fact, the EPA did not contest the State's ownership of submerged lands. The EPA asserted Congress delegated the authority to
administer water quality standards within state boundaries to Wisconsin, and, in a similar manner, the Sokaogon sought delegation within
reservation boundaries." The EPA reasoned the State's title to submerged lands did not preclude federal delegation of water quality
standards to the State, and therefore Wisconsin could not now object
to a similar tribal delegation.' The EPA further argued that Wisconsin
v. Baker dealt with the regulation of hunting and fishing, a right historically enjoyed by the states, and the Baker court specifically left the
door open for a tribe to claim jurisdiction based upon the Montana
test." In Baker, the tribe failed to argue that the lack of tribal regulation of nonmember fishing and hunting posed an imminent threat to
the political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the
tribe.' The Baker court implied that if the tribe had alleged such a
threat under the second exception to the Montana test, the result
might have been different. 9
In discussing the Montana test, the EPA stated it might not apply to
the Sokaogon case because the tribe owned all lands on the reservation."° If, however, the Montana test applied, the EPA reasoned the
TAS determination was nonetheless valid. The EPA claimed the Sokaogon easily satisfied the second exception of the Montana test because activities affecting water quality could have a serious and substantial impact on the tribe's ability to harvest wild rice, which was a signifi-

64. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2001).
65. See id. at 747.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323, 1395 (7th Cir. 1983).
69. See id. (emphasis added).
70. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 40, Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir.
2001) (No. 99-2618).
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cant food source for the tribe.7' The EPA responded generally to the
Montana test analysis by stating the CWA itself reflected a congressional
finding that activities impairing water quality have a serious and substantial impact on health and welfare."
6. The Seventh Circuit's Decision
The Seventh Circuit divided its discussion of Wisconsin's objections
into three main points, all of which related to the third requirement
for TAS status. The court first responded to Wisconsin's argument that
Rice Lake was not within the boundaries of the Sokaogon Reservation,
though the State failed to raise this issue at the district court level.
The State argued that since the legal description of the reservation
boundaries only ran to the ordinary high water mark of Rice Lake, the
lake itself was not within the reservation. 4 The court disposed of this
contention quickly, stating that even if it overlooked the failure of the
State to raise this issue earlier, it was reasonable for the EPA to conclude Rice Lake was on the reservation because the reservation almost
completely surrounded the lake.
Next, the Seventh Circuit tackled Wisconsin's jurisdictional claim
based upon the Equal Footing Doctrine. The court adopted Wisconsin's approach and assumed the State held title to the underlying lake
beds." The court acknowledged its previous ruling in Baker, but distinguished it from the present case by reminding Wisconsin that Congress
specified tribes could be treated as states under certain circumstances. 77
The court also agreed with the EPA in concluding the Baker court "left
open the possibility that state ownership of lake beds may not preclude
tribal authority over the waters if tribal regulation was necessary to protect the 'political integrity, the economic security, or the health and
welfare' of the Band."7 The court further agreed with the EPA's explanation that Baker dealt with fishing and hunting issues, which were
historically part of the states' jurisdictional realm, while "the ultimate
authority for the water quality standards lies with the federal EPA, not
the [S]tate of Wisconsin."79 The court explained, since Wisconsin did
not contend its ownership of lake beds precluded federal government
regulation when the State sought its own delegation of water quality
standards authority, the State could not now complain about federal
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 40.
Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 746.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

78.

Id t 747 (ritatinns nmitted.

79.

Id.
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delegation to the Sokaogon. " The court ultimately determined Baker
had little or no relevance to the Sokaogon TAS approval.'
The third point the court addressed was Wisconsin's contention
that the Sokaogon lacked authority to regulate off-reservation activities,
and, therefore, the EPA erroneously applied the Montana test."2 The
court stated the EPA's regulatory language required tribes to show they
already possessed authority over the "activities undoubtedly affected by
the water regulations."" The court explained that because the United
States Supreme Court held tribes had inherent authority under the
Montana test's second exception, it was reasonable for the EPA to determine "this authority [was] not defeated even if it exert[ed] some
regulatory force on off-reservation activities."8
Additionally, the court reasoned the EPA's interpretation was consistent with Strate v. A-1 Contractors? because water quality management
was critical to self-government.' In Strate, the United States Supreme
Court held a car accident occurring on a state highway located on an
Indian reservation between two nonmembers of the tribe did not rise
to the level of Montana's second exception. 7 In addition, the court
noted Wisconsin's case did not involve a situation similar to Nevada v.
Hicks where a state game warden investigated a crime on tribal land
that occurred off-reservation. 8 Therefore, the court concluded the
EPA's unique, fact-specific decision to grant the Sokaogon TAS status
in this case was "not arbitrary, unreasonable, or contrary to law" and
affirmed the judgment of the district court."
B. ANALYSIS
1. The Court's Conclusion Was Proper and Relied Upon Established
Precedent
The court's conclusion did not go beyond the bounds of established precedent. In City of Albuquerque v. Browner, the Tenth Circuit
considered a similar case where the Iseleta Pueblo Tribe received TAS
status and adopted water quality standards more stringent than both
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 748.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 749.
85. Strate v. A-l Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
86. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 748 (quoting Amendments to the Water Quality
Standards Regulation That Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg.
64,876, 64,879 (proposed Dec. 12, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131)).
87. Sirate, 520 U.S. at 442, 458-59.
88. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
89. Id. at 355.
90. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 750.
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state and federal standards." The City of Albuquerque operated a
waste treatment facility directly upstream of the reservation and it argued the tribe's new standards were problematic because they would
require the plant to implement more expensive treatment options."
The Tenth Circuit rejected the City's claim and held the tribe's authority to establish such standards was "in accord with powers inherent in
Indian tribal sovereignty. " "
In Wisconsin v. EPA, the Seventh Circuit used, in part, the Albuquerque case to defeat Wisconsin's claims that tribes had no inherent authority over off-reservation activities.9' The court implied Wisconsin
was applying a double standard to the Sokaogon because a downstream
state, such as Illinois, could, in like manner, require Wisconsin to
comply with downstream water quality standards.95 The court reasoned
Wisconsin's argument was similar to Albuquerque's in this regard and
ultimately agreed with the Tenth Circuit. 6
In Montana v. EPA, the only other tribal water quality standards
case, aside from Albuquerque, decided prior to this ruling, the court
applied the Montana test as the EPA envisioned in 1991." In that case,
the Ninth Circuit agreed with the agency determination that the "activities of the non-members posed such serious and substantial threats
to [t]ribal health and welfare that [t]ribal regulation was essential." "
Although the Ninth Circuit, in Montana v. EPA, held the EPA had not
"committed any material mistakes of law in its delineation of the scope
of inherent tribal authority,"" Wisconsin's equal footing arguments, in
Wisconsin v. EPA, imposed an additional hurdle for the Seventh Circuit.
Even so, the Seventh Circuit determined "it was reasonable for the
EPA, in line with the purposes of the Clean Water Act and the principles of Montana, to allow the tribe to regulate water quality on the reservation. " l°" Thus, the Seventh Circuit supported the assumption that
regulation of water quality can rise to the level of Montana's second
exception.
Despite the sound reasoning behind the court's general application of the Montana test to the realm of water quality regulation, the
court's specific application in this case was nonetheless puzzling. In
91. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 419-20 (10th Cir. 1996).
92. Id. at 419, 426 n.16.
93. Id. at 423.
94. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 748.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 749.
97. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,877 (proposed Dec. 12, 1991)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 131).
98. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998).
99. Id. at 1140.
100. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 750.
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Wisconsin v. EPA, the court applied the Montana test in two distinct
situations: (1) to overcome the State's equal footing claims under
Baker, and (2) to bolster the court's opinion with regard to the tribe's
ability to regulate off-reservation activities.
2. Equal Footing Claims Under Baker and the MontanaTest
The court stated that Congress gave the Sokaogon explicit authority over reservation waters through the CWA, yet still implied a Montana test analysis may be necessary to dispose of the limitations placed
upon tribal jurisdiction under Baker. While the court acknowledged
Baker left the door to regulate nonmembers open, a revelation arguably more important for tribes with alienated reservation land, the
court's analysis seemed to ignore that there was no alienated land on
the Sokaogon reservation.
In Montana v. United States, the United States Supreme Court laid
out tribal exceptions for the non-consensual regulation of nonmembers living on alienated land within the reservation.' ° These exceptions referred to "civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands."'" To address this issue, the court,
in Wisconsin v. EPA, analyzed Baker and gave some credence to the
State's desire to establish sovereignty over tribal lands within the
boundaries of the reservation. Even the suggestion of state authority
over tribal lands was an affront to tribal sovereignty. Tribal sovereignty
over tribal lands was a concept firmly imbedded in American jurisprudence and Wisconsin's suggestion that ownership of lake beds somehow extended its regulatory arm over tribal land was a bold one.
In 1987 the United States Supreme Court declared states needed
express permission from Congress before they could apply state law to
Indians on their reservations.0 The Court also recognized that absent
specific federal withdrawal, tribes retain sovereignty over both members and their territory. " In addition, Congress expressly decided to
treat tribes as states when they reauthorized the CWA in 1987. This
should have been enough to overcome Baker in the Seventh Circuit's
analysis, considering the tribe owned one-hundred percent of the reservation. The court's Montana analysis was arguably unnecessary with
regard to Baker and the Equal Footing Doctrine.
3. The MontanaTest and Off-Reservation Activities
In Browner, the Tenth Circuit held, "[u]nder the statutory and
regulatory scheme, tribes are not applying or enforcing their water
101.
102.
103.
104.

Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
Id. at 565.
California v.Carbazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987).
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9,14 (1987).
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quality standards beyond reservation boundaries."'' 5 Functionally,
however, a tribe could limit upstream discharges if the water failed to
meet tribal water quality standards upon reaching the reservation's
boundary. Wisconsin argued the Sokaogon failed to make a required
showing of authority over off-reservation activities. 1"
The Seventh Circuit used the Montana test to dispose of part of this
argument. The court explained that no case expressly rejected the
application of Montana to off-reservation activities; accordingly, it was
reasonable for the EPA to assume the exertion of some regulatory
force on off-reservation activities did not defeat the second exception
to the Montana test."7 The Seventh Circuit should not have adopted
this reasoning because it was unnecessary. The court rightly discussed
"extraterritorial effect" and made a significant point of saying this
situation could certainly occur between border states, such as Wisconsin and Illinois."' However, the court should have limited the extraterritorial discussion to the state example and should not have expanded
the use of Montana to an area where the doctrine was inapplicable off-reservation activities.
The court recognized the EPA developed a dispute resolution
mechanism to mediate conflicts arising between states and the EPA
Administrator ultimately decides such cases."6 The court reasoned that
"to interpret the statutes to deny that power to tribes because of some
kind of formal view of authority or sovereignty would treat tribes as
second-class citizens.""' However, nothing required a state to satisfy
the Montana test to demonstrate its authority to exert an extraterritorial effect over neighboring states. Thus, while the court on one hand
suggested treating tribes differently than states would be improper, it
then conversely held the Sokaogon to the Montana test.
Section 518 of the CWA expressly allowed tribes to be treated as
states to administer water quality standards programs on their respective reservations."' The court would have been wise to limit its discussion of off-reservation activities to the Albuquerque decision, where the
Tenth Circuit determined a tribe's authority to establish water quality
standards was "in accord with powers inherent in Indian tribal sovereignty.""'
Since the courts developed the Montana test while addressing tribal
regulation of nonmembers on alienated land, it seems incorrect to
assert that the test also applies to off-reservation activities. The court's
105.
106.

City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 424 (10th Cir. 1996).
Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 748 (7th Cir. 2001).
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significant use of the second exception from the Montana test suggests
it is a panacea for tribal jurisdiction. Contrary to that assumption,
Montana's main accomplishment has been the limitation of tribal jurisdiction. Rulings, such as Strate, only reinforce this concept by demonstrating the exception is, in reality, very narrow. If the courts overuse
the Montana test it will not benefit tribes or their sovereignty; the test
becomes only a way to reinforce the very narrow parameters of tribal
jurisdiction. It may be that, in an attempt to promote tribal jurisdiction, the EPA has actually laid the groundwork to further limit jurisdiction. Tribes that apply for TAS status are seeking, as the status implies,
the ability to be "treated as a state." Since most tribes believe they are
sovereign nations, this designation may demean the tribes. Even so,
based upon Montana's limitation on tribal civil regulatory ability, tribes
may have little choice but to acquiesce to TAS status if they wish to
control on-reservation water pollution.
4. Another Case for Another Day
As previously stated, the Sokaogon reservation does not contain
alienated land. In the decision's final paragraph, the Seventh Circuit
noted this unique land ownership characteristic and hypothesized that
"on a different set of facts" the EPA could extend a tribe's authority to
affect off-reservation activities beyond what the CWA allows." ' After
spending significant time applying the Montana test to a reservation
completely devoid of alienated land, the court refused to address the
alienated land situation but, rather, ambiguously proclaimed, "that will
be another case, for another day. 1. 4
C. CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit's decision in Wisconsin v. EPA was important
because it involved the right to set tribal water quality standards for a
reservation where the tribe owned one-hundred percent of the land. If
the Sokaogon failed in their pursuit of water quality standards authority, any tribe located within the Seventh Circuit would likely lose a state
challenge as well. The case demonstrated the lengths to which some
states might go in seeking complete regulatory control, or, in Wisconsin's case, the lengths to which a state might go to pollute. While the
decision was certainly a victory for Indian country, the court was extremely cautious in its approach. This caution was most likely due to
recent United States Supreme Court decisions, namely, Strate v. A-1
Contractorsand Nevada v. Hicks. The court's insistence on incorporating the Montana test in areas where the test did not apply is both puz113.
114.
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zling and problematic. However, the Seventh Circuit's acceptance of
the general concept that water quality regulations can satisfy the Montana test bodes well for tribes seeking regulatory authority over a reservation containing alienated land.
II. RISKS INHERENT IN THE PURSUIT OF INDIVIDUAL TRIBAL
DELEGATIONS OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY
The EPA's case-by-case approach in determining whether a tribe
meets the TAS jurisdictional hurdle subjects every tribal application to
a court challenge, potentially discouraging tribes from seeking TAS in
the first place. While the three United States Courts of Appeals' decisions have been encouraging for individual tribal delegations,"5 the
direction of three recent United States Supreme Court decisions
clouded the issue and concerned tribal advocates. This section will
discuss the three United States Supreme Court decisions and their potential effect on tribal delegations.
A.

STRATE V.

A-1

CONTRACTORS

In Strate, the Court held an accident occurring within a reservation
and on a state highway right of way did not rise to the level of Montana's second exception.11 In the opinion, the Court recognized that
unsafe driving on the reservation 'Jeopardize[d] the safety of tribal
members."" 7 Nonetheless, the Court determined a car accident involving two parties was not "the character of the tribal interest" the Court
envisioned Montana's second exception protecting."8 The Strate decision advised those who might argue Montana's second exception to
look at the entirety of that opinion when making a determination.'
Justice Ginsburg reminded a tribe's inherent power does not extend
beyond what the tribe needs "to protect tribal self-government or to
control internal relations."'" This decision did set a brighter line for
the application of Montana's second exception, yet the ability to regulate the reservation water quality should certainly rise above the "twovehicle accident standard" of Strate.
The mere nature of water quality standards regulation makes it
clear that such regulation cannot be made in piecemeal or checkerboard fashion. Tribal regulation of water quality would be impossible
to accomplish if tribes managed waters to attain a particular use and
115. See Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001); Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d
1135 (9th Cir. 1998); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996).
116.
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 458 (1997).
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
120.
Id. (tn
on.

120.

Id. (citing Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)).
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allowed fee land dischargers to release pollutants at a quantity above
those allowed by the tribal regulations. Those non-tribal, or fee land,
dischargers would completely frustrate tribal regulation and make it
impossible for tribes to enact their own laws and govern themselves
accordingly.
Tribal delegation of water quality standards authority can easily fall
within Montana's second exception. As the EPA clarified in its final
rule regarding TAS delegations to tribes under the CWA, "water quality
management serves the purpose of protecting public heath and safety,
which is a core governmental function, whose exercise is critical to selfgovernment."'"' Significantly, while Strate extended Montana's exceptions to the realm of adjudicatory jurisdiction, it merely affirmed Montana'sexceptions in their original regulatory context.
B. ATKrNSON TRADING Co. V. SHIRLEY
In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, the Court decided whether either

of Montana's two exceptions would apply where a reservation imposed
a hotel occupancy tax on a nonmember business located on fee-land.'
The Court reminded the parties tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers
on fee lands was limited and "[f]or powers not expressly conferred
upon them by federal statute or treaty, Indian tribes must rely upon
their retained or inherent sovereignty."'2 3 The Court decided since
Congress did not authorize the tax through treaty or statute, any civil
authority to issue such a tax must derive from one of Montana's two
exceptions.'24 In discussing the applicability of Montana's second exception,'

ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote, "[w] hatever effect petitioner's

operation of the Cameron Trading Post might have upon surrounding
Navajo land, it does not endanger the Navajo Nation's political integrity."'' 6 In its broadest sense, this statement amazingly contradicts Montana's second exception. Clearly, the Chief Justice failed to recognize
the possible environmental issues and impacts surrounding the operation of a large lodging and retail facility. Further, his statement could
be interpreted to mean that political integrity is simply not connected
to a clean and healthful environment. Although the Court in Strate
recognized that the specific language of Montana's second exception

Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to Stan121.
dards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,879 (proposed Dec. 12, 1991)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
122. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647-48 (2001).

123.
124.

Id. at 649-50.
Id. at 654.

125. The Court's holding that the tax did not meet Montana's first exception is beyond the scope of this article and will not be discussed.
126. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 659.
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should not be read in isolation,"7 nowhere did the Court say the second
exception should be disregarded altogether. The Court determined
the operation of a large non-tribal hotel and trading post within a reservation, surrounded primarily by tribal land, and employing nearly
one-hundred Navajo Indians, could never, under any circumstance,
threaten or have a direct effect on the political integrity of the tribe."'
More interesting is the Court's silence on whether or not the hotel's
operation would threaten or directly affect the economic security or
the health and welfare of the tribe - the remaining language of Montana's second exception. One must conclude the Court simply did not
believe Montana's second exception would apply in its entirety. The
only other conclusion inferred from this decision is that the Court
consumed Montana's second exception altogether. This conclusion
seems drastic though, especially in light of the Court's discussion of the
second exception without explicitly destroying it. In Atkinson Trading
Co., the Court narrowed the Montana exceptions even further. This
begs the question: does water quality protection still rise to the level of
Montana's second exception in light of the Court's ruling in Atkinson
TradingCo.?
If Rehnquist's opinion demonstrated anything, it illustrated why
judges make poor environmental decision-makers. Rehnquist's complete assumption that the Cameron Trading Post could not impact the
health and welfare of the tribe on a level also affecting the political
integrity of the tribe displayed a disturbing lack of knowledge. In his
opinion in Atkinson Trading Co., Rehnquist offered no explanation for
why the Court failed to implicate Montana's second exception. Congress, in adopting the CWA in 1972, was not quite so devoid of reason.
Congress adopted the CWA to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.

12

1

Congress

entrusted this task to the Administrator of the EPA and adopted section 518 of the CWA to accomplish this goal within the exterior
boundaries of recognized Indian reservations.' In implementing section 518, the Administrator determined the regulations tribes set could
pertain to non-Indian activities on reservations."' Although there has
been debate regarding congressional intent in adopting section 518's
regulation of non-Indians, 3 ' the Administrator, acting under the limits
of agency discretion provided under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense

127. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
128. See Atkinson TradingCo., 532 U.S. at 659.
129. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(2000).
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (2000).
131. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,881-82 (proposed Dec. 12, 1991)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
132. See id. at 64,876 (stating the congressional intent behind section 518).
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Council, Inc.,'" approved regulations for tribal applications for water
quality standards authority in 1991." The EPA's final rule outlined the
procedure for making determinations of tribal authority. In doing so,
the EPA presumed most tribes were "likely to posses the authority to
regulate activities affecting water quality on the reservation."' ' With
the support of the EPA's interpretation of the CWA, as well as the nature of water resources and water's importance in everyday life, it is
hard to imagine a court finding a failure to satisfy Montana's second
exception.
The "quasi-delegation" of authority to tribes was the caveat to the
EPA's administrative decision. Unlike the direct delegation of tribal
authority available under the EPA's discretionary interpretation of the
Clean Air Act ("CAA"),'" the EPA maintained an extra delegation
power that must be satisfied before a tribe gains direct regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA. Under the EPA's interpretation of section
518, a tribe must affirmatively demonstrate its regulatory authority by
establishing its inherent authority under federal Indian law, namely,
under Montana and BrendaleY7 Thus, a tribe, unlike states, must endure an additional test in order to access water quality standards authority over its surface waters. Although Congress delegated the authority to treat tribes as states to the EPA, the EPA has decidedly not
done so by adding an extra tribal requirement. This extra step has
caused significant debate and, not surprisingly, the EPA omitted such a
requirement in its final rule regarding the implementation of the CAA
to tribes."a
Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine how the Court's narrowing of
Montana's second exception in Atkinson Trading Co. could diminish a
tribe's control over water pollution and a tribe's ability to regulate surface waters of its reservation. Arguably, Atkinson Trading Co. may have
actually strengthened some tribes' claims ofjurisdiction over fee lands
within reservation boundaries. Chief Justice Rehnquist definitively
stated, "[i]rrespective of the percentage of non-Indian fee land within
a reservation, Montana's second exception grants Indian tribes nothing
'beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to conThe word "irrespective" suggests the pertrol internal relations. ' ""
centage of tribal land present within a reservation is immaterial to the
133. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
134. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,876.
135. Id. at 64,881.
136. Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254 (Feb.
12, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 35, 49, 50, and 81).
137. Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,880-81.
138. See Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7256.
139. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 658-59 (2001) (citation omitted).
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determination of whether a tribe has the inherent sovereignty to control the actions of nonmembers on fee lands. Since the EPA determined most tribes will reach the threshold level of Montana's second
exception in the realm of water quality regulation, tribes with smaller
amounts of tribal or allotted lands on their reservations may now have
a stronger position to regulate water resources. If a tribe or the EPA
can demonstrate that nonmember conduct substantially impacts a
tribe's health or welfare, it should not matter if tribal lands encompass
fifty percent or five percent of the reservation area.
Even though Atkinson Trading Co. constituted a defeat for tribal jurisdiction, congressional delegation of authority, though arguably
4
the impracticality of regulating water resources on a
quasi in nature,"'
checkerboard basis, and the potential for serious threats to health and
welfare, should allow tribal jurisdiction under section 518 to endure.
C. NEVADA V. HiCKS
Infatuated with Montana, the United States Supreme Court continued its onslaught on tribal jurisdiction in Nevada v. Hicks."' In Hicks,
the Court ruled a tribal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
to hear a civil claim arising against a state official who was investigating
an off-reservation violation of state law on Indian land. 42 The Court
determined under the Montana analysis, regulatory jurisdiction over
state officers in the context of the case was not necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations.'43 In addition,
the Court concluded Congress did not confer such regulatory jurisdiction.'"
Some have suggested the Court's holding "will radically alter the
nature of tribal sovereignty by substantially limiting the power of tribal
governments.".4 . Yet others have suggested the Court merely applied
Montana and Strate thus, Hicks did not and will not have broad effects
in civil contexts. 6 While there were certainly broad statements of dicta
140. In Montanav. EPA, the court stated CWA section 518 might be an express delegation of authority to tribes over all reservation resources. 941 F. Supp. 945, 951 (D.
Mont. 1996). The EPA refused to adopt this position due to overall statutory construction and its interpretation of legislative history. Id. at 957.
141.
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
142. Id. at 364-66.
143. Id. at 364.
144. Id.at 366.
145. Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal
Sovereignty, 37 NEWENG. L. REv. 641, 642 (2003).
146. Amy Crafts, Note, Nevada v. Hicks and its Implication on American Indian Sovereignty, 34 CoNN. L. REv. 1249, 1280 (2002); see also Catherine T. Struve, How Bad Law
Made a Hard Case Easy: Nevada v. Hicks and the Subject MatterJurisdiction of Tribal Courts,
5 U. PA. I. CONST. L. 288, 288 (2003) (supporting proposition that Nevada v. Hicks
followed logically from Montanaand Strate).
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in the opinion that warranted concern regarding tribal regulatory and
adjudicatory jurisdiction, the Court's treatment of Montana's second
exception remained consistent. Even though the Court reminded the
parties that "with one minor exception, we have never upheld under
Montana the extension of tribal civil authority over nonmembers on
non-Indian land,"' 7 the Court, nonetheless, continued to recognize the
existence of Montana's second exception. In other words, there must be
some situation to which the exception applies.
One potentially alarming conclusion was the Court's determination
that "tribal ownership [was] not alone enough to support regulatory
jurisdiction over nonmembers."'"8 The Court revealed that tribal ownership was only one factor in the Montana analysis and, at times, it may
be dispositive. However, in the context of a state game warden investigating a crime from outside the reservation, tribal ownership did not
confer tribal regulatory authority even where that investigation occurred on tribal land.' 9 To be certain, the Court missed an opportunity to maintain or firmly establish a Montana presumption of tribal
jurisdiction on tribal lands, but even if it had found such a presumption, it is not likely this Court would have applied it to a state official
under these circumstances. The lack of dissent and the content of the
concurring opinions provide an explanation.
Even though the concurring opinion of Justices O'Connor, Breyer,
and Stevens criticized the majority's disregard of tribal land ownership
under the Montana analysis, the opinion stated tribal interests under
Montana's second exception were "far more likely to be implicated
where, as here, the nonmember activity [took] place on land owned
and controlled by the tribe."'-' At first, the statement seems critical of
the majority, yet it by no means holds the Court to its original application of Montana: nonmember regulation on fee land. The statement,
as well as the fact that it was part of a concurrence, suggests the Justices
are "concerned but not convinced" tribal ownership of the land
should have made any difference in the case, but the concern did not
move them enough to dissent. Most likely, the majority of the Justices
would have found new direction from this case, whether stated explicitly in the majority opinion or implicitly in the aforementioned concurrence, that tribal land, which the original Montana analysis never
implicated, is now subject to the Court's overreaching use of Montana.
Since the EPA has used the Montana analysis in determining tribal
delegations under section 518, it does not seem appropriate to ring the
alarm, even though the Court has arguably further narrowed tribal
jurisdiction in Hicks. Tribal delegation under section 518 has with147.
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stood one court challenge, albeit in circuit court, since the Court's
opinion in Hicks. In Wisconsin v. EPA, the Seventh Circuit determined
that state ownership of the underlying lake beds was not dispositive
and ultimately ruled the tribe had authority to set water quality standards.'
This case is significant in light of Montana. In Montana, the
Court determined underlying lake beds were essentially fee-land Montana owned and, therefore, the Crow Tribe had no authority to regulate fishing and hunting of nonmembers in such waters.1"2 In Wisconsin
v. EPA, the Seventh Circuit examined its own decision in Wisconsin v.
Baker, which it decided on similar grounds as Montana, but refused to
apply its principles to reject the tribal assumption of authority in section 518.' In Baker, the Seventh Circuit determined state ownership of
the beds underlying navigable lakes on an Indian reservation precluded a tribe from regulating fishing and hunting of nonmembers on
those lakes.' 4 Yet, in Wisconsin v. EPA, the Seventh Circuit did not find
Baker dispositive of the case as Wisconsin advocated. The Seventh Circuit distinguished a tribal delegation of authority under section 518
from Baker, because Baker "did not involve a particular statute under
which Congress specified that tribes would be entitled to be treated as
states under particular circumstances, and both Congress and the responsible agency outlined the regulatory authority tribes were to exercise. , 15
Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded congressional enactment of
section 518 overcame the presumption against tribal regulation of
nonmembers from Montana and determined the EPA's application of
Montana's second exception was reasonable. This was particularly significant because the Seventh Circuit made this determination while
assuming Wisconsin owned the lake beds.' While the court reiterated
the Sokaogon, or Mole Lake, Indian reservation was composed entirely
of Indian land,' 7 it decided the case partly based upon the presumption that Wisconsin owned the lands underlying the waters of the reservation, similar to the Montana case.' Thus, one could argue, despite
the limiting reach of Wisconsin v. EPA because the tribe owned onehundred percent of the land, the presumed state land ownership of
the reservation lake beds broadened the applicability of the opinion.
Today, the Sokaogon regulate nonmember activity over what are arguably fee-lands within their reservation (i.e., the lakebeds).
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In Wisconsin v. EPA, the Seventh Circuit specifically noted the case
did not implicate the Hicks rule because it did not involve the specific
situation of a tribe restricting the activities of a state law enforcement
official on the reservation when the official was investigating an offreservation crime. 0 While the rule of Hicks was arguably broader than
the Seventh Circuit suggested, the court's overreaching use of Montana
should not permit activities that threaten the tribal delegation of authority under section 518. The congressional enactment of section 518
and the EPA's presumption that tribal delegations will satisfy Montana's
second exception should preclude the Hicks decision from impacting
tribal TAS applications. If Montana's second exception were to apply
anywhere, it should apply to support tribes that wish to regulate water
quality on their reservations. The Court should defer to the EPA's decisions regarding the effects upon a tribe's health and welfare, especially since Congress entrusted the EPA with the health of the Nation's
water quality.
HI. EPA'S APPROACH TO TRIBAL DELEGATIONS UNDER THE
CLEAN WATER ACT - IS FEDERAL PROMULGATION THE
ANSWER?
When the EPA applied the CAA to tribes, it undoubtedly recognized its shortcomings regarding its chosen implementation of section
518. In 1998, the EPA determined the CAA constituted a statutory
grant of jurisdictional authority to tribes,'" unlike the "quasidelegation" it outlined under the CWA's section 518.6 ' Eliminating
the extra step the EPA formulated for CWA delegation makes a delegation under the CAA "less messy" and arguably less susceptible to court
challenge. While some have suggested the EPA should adopt the identical approach it used for tribal delegations under the CAA, the EPA's
final rule, Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management,
clearly distinguished the regulations regarding delegation of the CAA
from those in the CWA. The EPA argued the overall statutory scheme
of the CAA, as well as its legislative history, provided "a clearer expression" of congressional intent than the CWA.'6
In adopting its CAA
regulations, the EPA successfully dodged the Montana test and, there159. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d at 748. In fact, the Court's opinion in Nevada v.
Hicks can be read to bold exactly what the Seventh Circuit suggested: the Court stated,
"[olur holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over

state officers enforcing state law." 533 U.S. 353, 358 n.2 (2001).
160. Indian Tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 63 Fed. Reg. 7254, 7254
(proposed Feb. 12, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 35, 49, 50, and 81).
161. See Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,881 (proposed Dec. 12,
1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131).
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fore, streamlined the tribal application process. As the regulation
clarified, "[i] t is a settled point of law that Congress may, by statute,
expressly delegate federal authority to a tribe."'"l While it may be simple to suggest the EPA complete a regulatory reversal and apply the
same principle to tribal regulatory delegations under the CWA, this
would require the EPA to repudiate both the CAA regulation and the
CWA regulation. In addition, three circuit court decisions" explained
that the EPA's approach to tribal regulatory delegations under the
CWA met the necessary burden regarding the regulation of nonIndians, and it was reasonable in light of the ambiguity of Brendale.
Faced with these realities, the EPA adopted a "new" strategy: federal water quality standards for Indian country. 6 ' The EPA's 1984 Indian Policy stressed two themes: (1) the federal government would
uphold the principle of Indian "self-government," and (2) it would
work directly with tribal governments on a "government-togovernment" basis."l Citing the inadequate water quality standards in
Indian country and, arguably, ignoring the main themes of its 1984
Indian Policy, the EPA set off down the path of least resistance. Troubled by court battles, though it has been largely successful, the EPA
now believes the best policy for dealing with tribes is to provide them
the opportunity to adopt federal water quality standards.
The new administration withdrew the proposed rule on January 22,
2001, which would have established "core" water quality standards for
all tribes except those who had previously obtained water quality standards authority or those tribes who affirmatively "opted out" of the
core standards proposal. 6 ' More than three years later, the EPA revived this proposal with a new round of consultation and outreach to
tribes." As the Interim Plan noted, the EPA developed the original
core standards proposal in consultation with more than 235 tribal representatives and the EPA's Tribal Caucus.169
Nonetheless, the EPA now plans to begin the process anew. The
problems with this approach seem to be just as clear as they were in the
last go-around. All fifty states have adopted water quality standards
that specifically address their individual needs. Under the cooperative
federalism approach, states who fail to adopt their own standards face
163.
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the threat of federal promulgation and administration of the water
quality standards program. Thus, it is not surprising that currently no
state has a federally promulgated and administered regulation. Tribes,
however, now face a one-size-fits-all regulation. It is hard to imagine
that 278 distinct and unique tribal reservations will find this broad approach appealing.
While some form of water quality enforcement in Indian country
may be better than none, one of the main forces driving this proposed
policy is the threat of an unfavorable court decision coming from a
successful state challenge to an individual tribal water quality standards
delegation. As the EPA stated in its shelved core water quality standards proposal and again reiterated in its Interim Plan, the "EPA does
not expect that the proportion of tribes with EPA-approved water quality standards will increase significantly in the near future."170 In a recent document, entitled Federal Water Quality Standards for Waters in
Indian Country: Questions and Answers, the EPA continued to advance
this new policy.17' The EPA noted, "[s]ome tribes believe it would be
difficult to obtain authorization" to administer their own water quality
standards programs, and therefore are looking at federally promulgated water quality standards.7 These tribes undoubtedly feel some
form of regulation is better than none. Yet, federally promulgated
tribal standards are already an available option to tribes; the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation opted for federally promulgated
If this approach is so appealing, however, one
standards in 1989.'
must wonder why only one tribe has sought federal promulgation. The
answer to this question is probably that tribes want to maintain a significant amount of control over their reservation's water resources and
feel that federal promulgation is not the solution.
Although the proposed policy will likely allow more flexibility than
the strict federal promulgation approach,17 it still seems to contradict
the EPA's 1984 Federal Indian Policy. Tribes will continue to wait and
see. The Colville Tribe was the first tribe in the country to receive EPA
promulgated water quality standards. In the fifteen years since this one
federal promulgation, it now seems the EPA's policy has come full circle. Some regulation is probably better then none, but as the EPA con170. Id. See also Federal Water Quality Standards for Indian Country and Other
Provisions Regarding Federal Water Quality Standards 4 (proposed Jan. 18, 2001 ) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 121, 122, 123, 131, 230, and 233), at
(unofficial prehttp://www.epa.gov/ost/standards/tribal/proposedcore200l.pdf
publication copy of the proposed rule) (last updated Nov. 2, 2004).
171.
U.S. EPA, FEDERAL WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR WATERS IN INDIAN COUNTRY:
available
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2004),
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3
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templates federal promulgation across all of Indian country, tribal input and involvement in administering water quality standards may become so attenuated that tribal water quality goals will remain largely
unrealized.
IV. CONCLUSION
Three United States Courts of Appeals concluded that the EPA's
interpretation of congressional intent in its final rule regarding implementation of water quality standards in Indian country was reasonable. When Congress passed the original CWA in 1972, it did not include provisions for tribal regulation. Yet, in 1987, when Congress reauthorized the CWA, it employed a method whereby the EPA could
treat tribes as states for purposes of adopting and implementing their
own water quality standards within their respective reservations. The
EPA asserted the CWA included the ability to regulate nonmembers on
fee-lands within those reservations if a tribe demonstrated it had the
inherent sovereignty to do so under the provisions of Montana'ssecond
exception. Recent United States Supreme Court decisions, such as
State v. A-1 Contractors, Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, and Nevada v.
Hicks, have not supported tribal sovereignty. Yet these decisions are
based, in large part, upon the Court's decision in Montana. The Court
has not removed the Montana exceptions, which allow tribes to regulate nonmembers on their reservations, and still supports tribes' regulation of activities of nonmembers within the boundaries of their reservations under some limited circumstances.
The Court articulated some instances where Montana's exceptions
do not apply, yet in the realm of water quality standards, the EPA presumes a tribe may reach Montana's second exception through its reading of Montana and Brendale. Since Congress entrusted the EPA to implement the CWA through cooperative federalism and since Congress
also credited the EPA with the expertise to make health and welfare
decisions under the CWA, it is not the role of the courts to determine
whether the management of water resources rises to the level of Montana's second exception.
The United States Supreme Court's recent decision that tribal
ownership of land is not conclusive of tribal civil regulatory control is
disconcerting. Nonetheless, a ruling that tribal regulation of water
resources under the CWA does not rise to the level of Montana's second exception would require the Court to eliminate the exception
altogether. Based upon the Court's recent and extensive use of Montana, it seems the mere existence of Montana's second exception creates some possibility of its application. Certainly, as one writer noted,
"[r]egulation of water on a reservation is critical to the lifestyle of its
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residents and the development of its resources."'75 In the case of the
Sokaogon, for example, the tribe required the protection of water for
subsistence hunting, fishing, gathering, and ceremonial use.17' These
activities are essential to the Sokaogon Tribe's survival as a people. If a
tribe cannot evoke the Montana test's second exception in such a critically important area as water quality, where can they?
The fears over whether the Court's may issue another bad decision
for Indian country are not unfounded. As one commentator noted,
"[a] common reason for slow or no program development is tribal
concern over state challenges to tribal sovereignty."'7 Yet, to rule
against tribal authority in such a case, the Court might have to abandon its recent precedent and forego the Montana exceptions. Abandoning Montana's exceptions seems unlikely based upon the Court's
recent and extensive use of them. Undoubtedly, cases involving Indian
country will continue to rise to the United States Supreme Court,
whether or not they are micro-managed by those practicing Indian
Law. These strategies have often proved important. However, a case
that finally finds the applicability of a Montana exception would be welcome.
Finally, one must consider the effectiveness of the EPA concerning
its implementation of section 518 of the CWA. While the EPA made
individual tribal delegations of water quality standards authority a
funding and regulatory priority in the early to mid-1990s, its recent
decision to abandon this policy is questionable. Providing tribes with
drastically vacillating policy directives breaks no new ground for the
federal government. However, tribes must question the motives of the
EPA in implementing federally promulgated standards for Indian
country and must consider the impact of such a decision on tribal sovereignty. It is certainly not a pleasure for the EPA to deal with an irate
state government forced to adjust its level of pollution to abide by
newly adopted tribal standards. Even though states must already modify discharges to avoid disputes with neighboring states, tribes may ultimately adopt standards that are necessarily more stringent to maintain their subsistence lifestyles. Federal standards that only allow for
minimum levels of protection cause little conflict and provide fewer
responsive remedies for tribes seeking to limit the discharges of more
pollution permissive state governments. While an unsuccessful individual delegation attempt may generate an unfavorable court decision,
in the end, tribes may have to question the importance of preserving
175. Daniel L.S.J. Rey-Bear, The PFathead Water Quality StandardsDispute: Legal Bases For
TribalReg-datory Authority Over Non-Indian Reservation Lands, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 151,

194 (1996) (quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir.
1981)).
176. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2001).
177. Grijalva, supra note 6, at 68.
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the right to pseudo-regulate water quality under a blanket federal
scheme. Acquiescing to this loss of sovereignty may strengthen the
state argument that tribes do not need water quality standards to protect their political integrity, health, or welfare.

